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Subjects were given five trials to memorize 22-word sentences that 
varied in degree of self-embedding. Sentences with self-embedded 
phrase structure proved more difficult to learn, which is interpreted 
to mean that our capacity to deal with recursive interruptions may 
be extremely limited. 
The problem posed for our subjects in the present exper iment will be 
famil iar to anyone who has tr ied to discuss algebra over the telephone. 
It is not too difficult to indicate by appropriate emphasis and intonation 
that "A  plus B times C" refers to A + BC, rather than to (A + B)C, 
but when the expression becomes only a little more complicated both 
talker and listener begin to flounder rather badly. Spoken communica-  
tion is not the best med ium for indicating parenthetical constructions. 
It is interesting, therefore, that in spite of our inability to cope with 
complicated parenthetical constructions in vocal forms, all natural 
languages, including English, make provision for just such constructions 
in the sentences we speak. For example, the sentence, The man who 
said that a cat killed the rat is a liar, is perfect ly grammat ica l  and has 
one sentence (a cat killed the rat) nested inside of another (the man who 
said that is a liar). But  now carry the process another step and put  the 
dog chased the cat inside a cat killed the rat, in the form of a relat ive clause: 
a cat that the dog chased killed the rat. When all three are put  together  
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into a single sentence, The man who said that a cat that the dog chased 
killed the rat is a liar, the result begins to be a bit confusing. Add another 
relative clause for the sentence, the boy owns the dog, and we get a really 
difficult, but still perfectly grammatical sentence: The man who said 
that a cat that the dog that the boy owns chased killed the rat is a liar. Or 
we can work in the other direction, and wrap another sentence around 
that one: It is more likely that the man who said that a cat that the dog that 
the boy owns chased killed the rat is a liar than not. Unless special and 
rather arbitrary rules are introduced to prevent it, this sort of gram- 
matical onion could grow indefinitely. 
Obviously, people do not talk this way. There are in English alterna- 
tire constructions that enable us to say all this in a much simpler way: 
It is more likely than not that the man is a liar who said that the rat was 
killed by a cat that was chased by the dog that is owned by the boy. Since 
both are equally acceptable according to the rules of grammar, any 
preference for the latter must have some psychological, rather than 
linguistic, explanation. This fact seems to have been clearly stated first 
by Yngve (1960), although e used it as the basis for certain generaliza- 
tions about linguistic structure and evolution that we would not endorse 
(Miller and Chomsky, 1963). Yngve points out, quite correctly, that the 
discontinuous constituents of the nested sentence impose a severe load 
on our short-term emory, whereas the alternative form does not. In 
order to deal with nested constructions, the language user must hold in 
memory the still unresolved portion of one constituent while he is pro- 
eessing another. When two or three initial portions must be remembered, 
all in proper order, the task becomes quite difficult. Nested constructions, 
therefore, pose a problem of some psychological interest. 
Nesting is also of considerable interest for the general theory of 
grammar. Two types are generally distinguished: nesting refers to the 
insertion of one construction i to the middle of another; when the in- 
serted construction is of the same grammatical form as the construction 
into which it is inserted, it is called self-embedding. (These definitions 
can easily be made precise; for a general review of this and related 
matters, see (Chomsky and Miller, 1963).) The admissibility in natural 
languages of an indefinite number of self-embedded lements was used 
by Chomsky (1956) to demonstrate hat a formal characterization f 
natural grammars in terms of the finite-state, Markovian models used 
by information theorists is impossible in principle; later (Chomsky, 
1959) he was able to prove that the additional power of the phrase- 
294 M~LLER AND ISARD 
structure grammars that linguists had been using was attributable 
entirely to their capacity for generating self-embedded constructions. 
The fact that an indefinite number of self-embeddings is grammati- 
cally acceptable, yet at the same time psychologically unacceptable, 
would seem to imply that a clear distinction is necessary between our 
theory of the language and our theory of the language user. This simple 
conclusion is resisted, however, by many workers. Some linguists resist 
it because they believe that the description of a language would be 
useless if it did not describe the verbal behavior of people who use the 
language. And some psychologists resist it because they believe that the 
description of behavior exhausts the entire range of topics that a scien- 
tist is licensed to study. Without entering into this somewhat confusing 
argument, let us say simply that the distinction between knowing a 
rule and obeying it seems to us both valuable and necessary, and on this 
basis it is possible to find a reasonable division of labor between lin- 
guists and psychologists, one that does not annex to either the territory 
that rightfully belongs to the other. 
The present study, therefore, should be viewed as a contribution to 
our psychological understanding of the language user, and not as an 
attempt to revise or limit our statement of the rules of grammar in any 
way. 
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
Sentences with varying degrees of self-embedding were recorded and 
played to listeners who attempted to learn them one at a time by the 
method of free recall. 
Six sentences, all 22 words long, were used. In their unembedded forms, 
these sentences were: They saw the old lady that kicked the dog that fol- 
lowed the boy that delivered the newspaper that told about the fire; Jack 
kissed the girl that met the man that wrote the book that told the story that 
was about a nuclear war; We cheered the football squad that played the 
team that brought he mascot hat chased the girls that were in the park; She 
liked the man that visited the jeweler that made the ring that won the prize 
that was given at the fair; He teased the little boy that joined the club that 
stole the green apples that made the pie that tasted very good; and She 
thanked the producer that discovered the plot that became the script that 
made the movie that was applauded by the critics. All relative clauses were 
introduced by that, in order to avoid stylistic variations among that, who, 
and which; in preliminary experiments it had been found that these 
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SENTENCE 
shirked" / ~.CL 
,hereon: / "~a,.V~ 
~h°! . /  ">.~ 
visi,e~ / 5,.cL 
the jewele~" / 5'.~ 
,ho~" / 5'.~ 
~°~el / ">.CL 
the ring" / "~W 
won: / ">.c, 
the prize" / "~V ~ 
we:h~/;en / o~? the foir 
FIG. 1. Schematic tree diagram of the phrase structure of a sentence with no 
self-embedding. 
variations were quite difficult to remember, and since they tended to 
obscure the main effects of self-embedding, they were simply eliminated. 
Each subject memorized all six sentences, but each in a different 
syntactic form. He learned one sentence presented with no self-em- 
bedding, another with one degree of self-embedding, another with two, 
three, or four, and one sentence with the words scrambled in haphazard 
order. The different degrees of self-embedding were all obtained in the 
manner illustrated for the following sentences: (0) She liked the man 
that visited the jeweler that made the ring that won the prize that was given at 
the fair; (1) The man that she liked visited the jeweler that made the ring 
that won the prize that was given at the fair; (2) The jeweler that the man 
that she liked visited made the ring that won the prize that was given at the 
fair; (3) The ring that the jeweler that the man that she liked visited made 
won the prize that was given at the fair; (4) The prize that the ring that the 
jeweler that the man that she liked visited made won was given at the fair; 
and (random) Won given liked that that the fair man made visited prize 
the at the the she that jeweler was the ring that. Six sentences, each pre- 
sented in these six forms, gave 36 items in all. Note that exactly the 
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SENTENCE 
the t 'rhe fair 
the j e w ~  ~'~made 
the man/~~ "~"~v isited 
that she liked 
FIG. 2. Schematic tree diagram of the phrase structure of a sentence with four 
degrees of self-embedding. 
same 22 words are used in all six versions of any sentence, the only 
difference being in the phrase structure underlying them. 
The phrase structure of a sentence with zero embeddings i shown 
diagrammatically (with details omitted) in Fig. 1, where VP, NP, and 
CL represent verb phrase, noun phrase, and clause, respectively. This 
is a right-branching structure, since the reeursive lement is not inserted 
into the middle of another construction, but always at the right end of 
it. In Fig. 2 a comparable diagram is shown for the same sentence with 
four self-embeddings; in this sentence, the recursive lement interrupts 
the construction i to which it is inserted. Sentences with intermediate 
degrees of self-embedding all begin with a phrase structure similar to 
that in Fig. 2 and end with a right-branching construction similar to 
that in Fig. 1. 
The 36 items were read aloud by one of the authors (GAM) and re- 
corded on magnetic tape. This recording was then duplicated and 
spliced to produce the test materials actually used in the experiment. 
Considerable pains were taken to obtain satisfactory renditions of each 
sentence, since in exploratory experiments with unrecorded presenta- 
~ECALL OF EMBEDDED SENTENCES 297 
tions it had been impossible to decide whether the learners' poor per- 
formance on the self-embedded strings should be attributed to their 
inability to understand and remember such constructions, or to the 
speaker's inability to read them properly, or both. Practice and re- 
recording were continued, therefore, until in the judgment of the talker 
a spoken version of each sentence was recorded that contained all of the 
auditory clues to grouping that he could express vocally. The random 
strings of words were read with simulated sentence intonation, as similar 
to the sentences as possible. 
In the learning situation, the recorded sentences were played over 
earphones to the subject. As soon as the sentence finished he attempted 
to repeat it verbatim. His repetition was recorded on an office dictation 
machine and scored later. A single sentence was presented and repeated 
five times in this way. Then another sentence was presented five times, 
etc., until the subject had memorized all six sentences, each in a different 
syntactic form. Six different orders of presentation f the sentences were 
prepared, in counterbalanced design, and four subjects learned them in 
each order. Before the test began, however, each subject memorized one 
practice sentence with two self-embeddings in order to eliminate the 
"warm-up" effect and to ensure that he understood the task and the 
use of the dictation equipment; data obtained from this practice sentence 
were discarded. 
RESULTS 
The responses by the subiects were scored in terms of the number of 
words recalled in the same order as the words in the original sentence. 
(The total number of words correct, regardless of order, was also ex- 
amined; the scores were slightly higher, particularly for the random 
strings, but the relative differences as a function of embedding were not 
affected.) Omissions were counted as errors; novel words added by the 
subject during recall were simply ignored. 
The averaged results for the 24 subjects who served in this study are 
displayed graphically in Fig. 3; since there were 22 words per sentence, 
each point is based on a sample of 528 observations. 
The first thing to note is that learning occurred; for all types of sen- 
fences the average percentage of the words reca]led and in correct order 
increased on successive r petitions. The second point to note is that all 
of the grammatical sentences were much easier than the haphazard 
strings of words; obviously, the presence of grammatical structure, even 
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3 / //// 
w 0 
a. 0 2 3 4 5 
SUCCESSIVE TRIALS 
FzG. 3. The percentage of words recalled correctly and in the correct order is 
plotted as a function of the number of trials given, with the syntactic omplexity 
of the sentences as the parameter. Points are averages for 24 subjects. 
in the self-embedded form, was a considerable aid and permitted the 
subjects to transfer their normal inguistic skills to this learning situa- 
tion. Finally, and of most interest, self-embedding made the sentences 
more difficult o learn. With one exception, on every trial the number of 
errors increased as the degree of self-embedding increased. The exception 
occurred on trials four and five, where there is a minor reversal of the 
general trend in the case of three and four degrees of self-embedding. 
An alternative way to analyze the data is to consider the trial on which 
a subject achieved his first perfect recall of each type of sentence. These 
distributions are summarized for the 24 subjects in Table I for zero 
through four self-embeddings; no subjects achieved a perfect recall of 
the scrambled strings within the limit set by the five trials allowed. From 
this table we see, for example, that two of the 24 subjects repeated the 
unembedded sentence perfectly the first time they heard it, that seven 
more got it on the second trial, etc. This way of presenting the data 
makes the differences in difficulty appear somewhat more dramatic than 
do the learning curves of Fig. 1. 
RECALL OF EMBEDDED SENTENCES 299 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS ACHIEVING FIRST PERFECT RECALL ON OR BEFORE 
A GIVEN TR IAL(N= 24) 
Trim Number of embeddings 
0 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 0 1 0 
2 9 8 5 4 0 
3 17 15 11 5 0 
4 21 16 16 6 4 
5 22 18 18 10 8 
DISCUSSION 
If  we take the difference between the unembedded sentences and the 
random str ings of words as a measure of the max imum effect on per- 
formance in this s i tuat ion that  can be produced by  rearranging the 
order of the words, then it is obvious that  the shift in performance 
a t t r ibutab le  to self -embedding is only a fract ion of the max imum pos- 
sible shift. I f  we consider only the average performances on the first 
tr ial  (since the unembedded sentences are so well recalled on subsequent 
tr ials that  the comparison is difficult), 16.4 words were recalled in the 
correct order for unembedded sentences, 12.7 for sentences with four 
self-embeddings, and only 4.4 for the random strings of words. 
A l though precise calculat ions are probab ly  unwarranted,  a rough 
est imate based on the following argument  serves to indicate that  this is 
approx imate ly  what  might  have been expected. According to the argu- 
ment  (Miller, 1956a, b), these sentences differ in diff iculty because, from 
a psychological  po int  of view, they differ in length. 1 If  we th ink  of the 
unembedded sentences as five psychological  units (five simple sentences) 
i Behavioral evidence in support of this hypothesis can be obtained by ob- 
serving eye movements. Drs. Norman Mackworth and J. S. Bruner (personal 
communication) have recorded the eye movements of subjects reading these 
sentences and have found that the number of fixations and the number of re- 
gressive movements of the eyes both increase markedly as the amount of self- 
embedding increases; if the number of fixations can be used as an index of the 
number of psychological units that a reader must assimilate, then self-embedding 
clearly operates to increase the effective number of units per sentence. It  should 
be noted, however, that some readers make a first pass through the entire sentence 
before they return to fit the pieces together--a multiple-pass strategy that was 
not available to the listeners in the present experiment. 
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long, then the average unit is about 22/5 = 4.4 words long. Four of those 
units are broken in two by the four degrees of embedding, iving the 
sentences with four embeddings an effective psychological length of nine 
units, with the average unit about 22/9 = 2.4 words long. The random 
strings would be 22 units long, where each unit is one word long. To 
obtain the number of these hypothetical units that subjects could retain 
in immediate memory, therefore, we simply divide the total number of 
words correctly recalled by the number of words per unit. The result is 
3.7 units for unembedded text, 5.2 units for sentences with four self- 
embeddings, and 4.4 units for the random strings. These are reasonably 
equal, although the figalres for four self-embeddings is too high, which 
may mean that the subjects could, to a certain extent, organize the dis- 
continuous constituents a single units, i.e., that there were fewer than 
nine units involved. 
Although this argnment may have some general validity, it is not 
adequate to explain the finer details of the experimental results. In 
particular, it does not account for the fact, obvious on inspection of Fig. 
2, that the performance urves for zero and one degree of self-embedding 
are quite close, as are the curves for three and four embeddings, with 
performance on the doubly embedded sentences falling somewhere in 
between. In order to explain this spacing, which was also characteristic 
of the results obtained in preliminary experiments, a more explicit 
argument is required. 
Suppose that for the moment we think in terms of an analogy with 
information processing by eomputer systems. Let us imagine that any- 
one who knows English has something corresponding to a relative clause 
subroutine that can be called to process sentences containing such 
structures. When this subroutine is called, the main sentence-analyzing 
routine is interrupted and the point at which it must be resumed is 
stored temporarily until the subroutine has been executed. As long as the 
sentence contains only one such construction, little difficulty will result. 
But now suppose that, while the subroutine is being executed, a second 
such construction is encountered, so the subroutine is required to call 
itself. If this recursive feature were not available, confusion would result; 
the temporary memory for the point of re-entry into the main routine 
might be erased, for example, so that when it resumed, the main routine 
would have to treat subsequent words as if they began a new constituent 
of the sentence. This analogy can help us to understand why perform- 
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ance with zero and one embedding were approximately equivalent, but 
two, three, and four embeddings were more difficult. 
Several related observations can be cited to lend credibility to this 
analogy. In several nonsystematic observations it has been noted that 
nested constructions, which would involve different types of subroutines, 
are less difficult to understand and remember than are self-embedded 
constructions of the same degree. That is, if, in the middle of executing 
the relative clause routine, some other type of subroutine is called, there 
does not seem to be as much interference in remembering the point at 
which the main program must be resumed after the relative clause sub- 
routine is completed. The analogy in terms of grammatical subroutines 
seems to offer a possible way to explain this difference between esting 
and embedding (which, of course, should be validated in further experi- 
ments). We need assume merely that entering a different subroutine 
does not erase the temporary storage of the point of re-entry on com- 
pletion of the original subroutine. 
Moreover, Mackworth and Bruner's recordings of eye movements 1 
while reading such sentences confirms the introspective impression that 
the difficulty does not begin until the long string of apparently unrelated 
verbs is encountered toward the end of the self-embedded sentence. At 
this point the reeursive ye movements begin and one feels that all grasp 
of the sentence structure has suddenly crumbled away. Difficulty at this 
point is, of course, exactly what the subroutine analogy would lead us 
to expect, since not until then would the loss of re-entry addresses have 
any serious effect on the processing of the sentence. 
As Table I indicates, however, some of the subiects handled two self- 
embeddings as well as they handled one, which suggests that the sub- 
routine analogy needs to be modified slightly to admit the possibility 
that some subjects can handle two self-embeddings. Examination of the 
data for individual subjects eems to support his suggestion. 
Of the 24 subjects, 12 made as few errors (summed over all 5 trials) in 
memorizing a sentence with one relative clause as they did with a sen- 
tence having none; these two types of sentence are, for most people, 
about equally easy. If we take as a subject's optimal performance on 
sentences with simple syntax the better of his two scores on sentences 
with zero and one embedding, we find that six subjects actually exceeded 
this score (made fewer total errors) in learning a sentence with two era- 
beddings. However, no one exceeded this optimal performance for sen- 
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fences with three or four self-embeddings. In short, most subjects could 
handle one relative clause, and some managed two, but no one learned 
sentences with three or four self-embedded relative clauses without 
encountering difficulty. Apparently, some subjects were able to retain 
the point at which the main program was to be resumed and simul- 
taneously to retain the point at which the subroutine was to be resumed, 
even when the second subroutine called was the same as the first. Re- 
taining three or four such points of resumption, however, seems to have 
been impossible. 
It is difficult o do more than speculate about these matters, for we 
are here faced by a type of cognitive task--the handling of interrup- 
t ions-about which very little is known. Drs. Allen Newell and H. A. 
Simon (personal communication) have pointed out that our ability to 
resume interrupted tasks at the precise point we left them off is a matter 
of considerable importance for the simulation of cognitive processes by 
computers, and that a series of studies aimed at this type of temporary 
memory would be particularly valuable and not too difficult to design. 
In any case, if we are willing to regard our ability to process elf- 
embedded sentences as a measure of our ability to deal with reeursive 
interruptions in general, then the present experiment demonstrates that, 
in the absence of environmental reminders and memory aids, our capaci- 
ties in this direction are very limited indeed. Exactly how significant this 
fact may be for our information processing theories of cognition in 
general, and for our theory of the language user in particular, cannot be 
determined, however, until we understand more clearly what the limit 
is and what factors affect it. 
RECEIVED: September 5, 1963 
REFERENCES 
C~O~SKY, N. (1956), Three models for the description of language. IRE Trans. 
Inform. Theory,-IT2, 113-114. 
CHO~SKV, N. (1959), On certain formal properties of grammars. Inform. and 
Control 9., 137-167. 
CHOMSKY, N. ~,ND MILLER, G. A. (1963), Introduction to the formal analysis of 
natural anguages. In "Handbook of Mathematical Psychology," R. D. Luce, 
R. R. Bush, and E. Galanter, eds., Vol. 2, Chap. 11, pp. 269-321. Wiley, New 
York. 
MILLER, G. A. (1956), The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits 
on our capacity for processing information. Psychol. Rev. 63, 81-97. 
RECALL OF EMBEDDED SENTENCES 303 
MILLER, G. A. (1956b), Human memory and the storage of information. IRE 
Trans. Inform. Theory IT-2, 129-137. 
MILLER, G. A. AND CttOMSKY, N. (1963), Finitary models of language users. In 
"Handbook of Mathematical Psychology," R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, and E. 
Galanter, eds., Vol. 2, Chap. 13, pp. 419-491. Wiley, New York. 
YNGVE, V. H. (1960), A model and an hypothesis for language structure. Proc. 
Am. Phil. Soc. 104, 444-466. 
